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This paper presents results on the deﬁnition of a sequent calculus for Minimal Implicational Propositional
Logic (M→) aimed to be used for provability and counter-model generation in this logic. The system tracks
the attempts to construct a proof in such a way that, if the original formula is a M→ tautology, the tree




Proof search (validity) in Minimal Implicational Propositional Logic (M→) is a
PSPACE-Complete problem as stated by Statman in [14] who also shows that
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M→ polynomially simulates Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPL). This simula-
tion can be used to polynomially simulate Classical Logic too, although Classical
Logic seems to be in a smaller complexity class 5 . This result points out that M→ is
as hard to implement as the most popular propositional logics. Haeusler shows in
[7] that M→ can polynomially simulate not only Classical and Intuitionistic Propo-
sitional Logic but also Full Minimal Propositional Logic and any other decidable
propositional logic with a Natural Deduction system with the sub-formula property.
Because of those features, M→ can be used as a base tool to study complexity of
many other logics.
Our goal here is to present a sequent calculus forM→ which allows the deﬁnition
of a uniﬁed procedure for provability and counter-model generation in this logic. The
calculus is based on a set of rules and in a general strategy for application of the
rules in such a way that we can avoid the usage of loop checkers and the necessity
of working with diﬀerent systems for provability and refutation. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst proof calculus for M→ where validity and counter-model
generation are done in a single procedure.
Counter-model generation (using Kripke semantics) is achieved as a consequence
of the completeness of the system. We are also developing an interactive theorem
prover for M→ based on the in here proposed calculus. Its source code can be found
at https://github.com/jeffsantos/sequent-prover.
2 Minimal Implicational Logic
2.1 Semantics
The Minimal Implicational Logic (M→) is the fragment of Minimal Logic containing
only the logical constant →. Its semantics is the intuitionistic semantics restricted
to → only. Thus, given a propositional language L, a M→ model is a structure
〈U,,V〉, where U is a non-empty set (worlds),  is a partial order relation on U
and V is a function from U into the power set of L, such that if i, j ∈ U and i  j
then V(i) ⊆ V(j). Given a model, the satisfaction relationship |= between worlds
in models and formulae is deﬁned as in Intuitionistic Logic, namely:
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i p, p ∈ L, iﬀ, p ∈ V(i)
• 〈U,,V〉 |=i α1 → α2, iﬀ, for every j ∈ U , such that i  j, if 〈U,,V〉 |=j α1
then 〈U,,V〉 |=j α2.
As usual a formula α is valid in a model M, namely M |= α, if and only if, it
is satisﬁable in every world i of the model, namely ∀i ∈ U,M |=i α. A formula is a
M→ tautology, if and only if, it is valid in every model.
2.2 Syntax
It is known that Prawitz Natural deduction system for Minimal Logic with only the
→-rules (→-Elim and→-Intro) is sound and complete for theM→ regarding Kripke
5 We remember that we do not know whether NP = PSPACE or not.
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semantics. As a consequence of this, Gentzen’s LJ system ([15, p. 81]) containing
only right and left →-rules is also sound and complete. As it is well known the
→-left rule of LJ does not preserve invalidity. Figure 1 shows structural and logic
rules of an adapted Gentzen’s sequent calculus for M→ based on [16, p. 18, §3].
Basically, we restrict the right side of a sequent to one and only one formula (we
are in M→thus sequents with empty right side does not make sense). This implies
that structural rules can only be considered for main formulae on the left side of a
sequent.
A central aspect when considering mechanisms for proof search in M→(and also
for IPL) is the application of the →-left rule. Sequent calculus for classical logic
(Gentzen’s LK system - [15, p. 81]) ensures that each rule when applied in a
bottom-up manner in the proof search reduces the degree of the main formula of
the sequent (the formula to which the rule is applied). This implies the termination
of the system. For LJ we have the restriction that the right side of a sequent only
allows one formula and, as we can reuse a hypothesis in diﬀerent parts of a proof,
the main formula must be available to be used again by the generated premises.
Thus, →-left rule has the repetition of the main formula in the premises, a scenario
that allows the occurrence of loops in automatic procedures.
axiom




α, α,Δ ⇒ γ
contraction
α,Δ ⇒ γ
Γ, α, β,Δ ⇒ γ
exchange
Γ, β, α,Δ ⇒ γ
Δ ⇒ α α,Γ ⇒ γ
cut
Δ,Γ ⇒ γ
Δ, α ⇒ β →-right
Δ ⇒ α → β
Δ, α → β ⇒ α Δ, α → β, β ⇒ γ →-left
Δ, α → β ⇒ γ
Fig. 1. Rules of Gentzen’s LJ
3 The Sequent Calculus LMT→
In this section we present a sound and complete sequent calculus for M→. We call
this system LMT→. We can prove for each rule that if all premises are valid, then
the conclusion is also valid and if at least one premise is invalid then the conclusion
also is. Besides that, this proof is constructive in the sense that for any sequent we
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have an eﬀective way to produce either a proof or a counter-model of it.
We start deﬁning the concept of sequent used in the proposed calculus. A sequent
in our system has the following general form:
{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , ...,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, ..., pn], ϕ (1)
where ϕ is a formula in L and Δ, Υp11 ,Υp22 , ...,Υpnn are bags 6 of formulae. Each
Υpii represents formulae associated with an atomic formula pi.
A sequent has two focus areas, one in the left side (curly bracket) and another in
the right (square bracket). Curly brackets are used to control the application of the
→-left rule and square brackets are used to keep control of formulae that are related
to a particular counter-model deﬁnition. Δ′ is a set of formulae and p1, p2, ..., pn
is a sequence that does not allow repetition. We call context of the sequent a pair
(α, q), where α ∈ Δ′ and ϕ = q, where q is an atomic formula on the right side of
the sequent.
The axioms and rules of LMT→ are presented in Figure 2. In each rule, Δ′ ⊆ Δ.
Rules are inspired by their backward application. In a →-left rule application,
the atomic formula, q, on the right side of the conclusion goes to the []-area in the
left premise. Δ formulae in the conclusion are copied to the left premise and marked
with a label relating each of them with q. Left premise also has a copy of Δ formulae
without the q-label. This is a mechanism to keep track of proving attempts. The
form of the restart rule is better understood in the completeness proof on Section 6.
A forward reading of rules can be achieved considering the notion of validity, as
described Section 5.
4 A Termination Strategy for LMT→
The following is a general strategy to be applied with the rules of LMT→ to generate
proofs from an input sequent (a sequent that is candidate to be the conclusion of
a proof), that is based on bottom-up application of the rules. From the proposed
strategy, we can then state a proposition about termination of the proving process.
A goal sequent is a new sequent in the form of 1, premise of one of the system’s
rule, generated by the application of this rule during the proving process. If the
goal sequent is an axiom, this branch stops. If it is not and this goal can not be
expanded anymore in this branch, then halt and empty the bag of goals. A goal
can not be expanded anymore in a branch when we have applied the restarted rule
for every atomic formula that appear on the right side over that branch. Otherwise
apply the ﬁrst applicable rule in the following order:
(i) Apply →-right rule if it is possible, i.e., if the formula on the right side of
the sequent, outside de []-area is not atomic. The premise generated by this
application is the new goal of this branch.
(ii) Choose the leftmost formula of a highest degree on the left side of the sequent,
6 Sets that take repetitions into account: {A, A, B} is not the same set as {A, B}
J. de Barros Santos et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 324 (2016) 165–179168
axiom{Δ′, q},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], q
{Δ′, α},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δ, α ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], β focusα{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δ, α ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], β
{},Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi,Υpi+1i+1 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δq ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi+1, . . . , pn, q], pi restartpi{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpii ,Υpi+1i+1 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi, pi+1, . . . , pn], q




Υpii and p¯ = p1, p2, . . . , pn, we have:
{α → β,Δ′},Υ,Δq,Δ ⇒ [p¯, q], α {α → β,Δ′},Υ,Δ, β ⇒ [p¯], q →-leftα→β{α → β,Δ′}Υ,Δ ⇒ [p¯], q
Fig. 2. Rules of LMT→
not labeled yet, i.e., a formula α ∈ Δ that is not occurring in Δ′, then apply
the focus rule. The premise generated by this application is the new goal of
this branch.
(iii) If all formulae on the left side have already been focused, choose the ﬁrst
formula α ∈ Δ′ such that the context (α, q) was not yet tried since the last
application of a restart rule. We say that a context (α, q) is already tried when
a formula α on the left was expanded (by the application of →-left rule) with q
as the formula outside the []-area on the right side of the sequent. The premises
generated by this application become new goals of the respective new branches.
(iv) Choose the leftmost formula inside the []-area that was not chosen before in this
branch and apply the restart rule. The premise generated by this application
is the new goal of this branch.
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Figure 3 shows an attempt proof tree generated by the application of the afore-
mentioned strategy.
Proposition 4.1 Given that the bag of goals contains only one copy of
{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , ...,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], ϕ then, based on the aforementioned
strategy, LMT→ eventually stops.
Proof.
• →-right rule is applied until we obtain an atomic formula on the right side.
• focus rule is applied until every non-labeled formula become focused. The same
formula can not be focused twice, unless a restart rule is applied.
• →-left rule can not be applied more than once to a formula, unless a restart
rule is applied.
• between two applications of the restart rule in a branch there is only one
possible application of a →-left rule for a context (α, q).
• restart rule is applied only once for each atomic formula that appears on the
right side of sequents in a branch. This implies a ﬁnite number of application
of the restart rule.

Observation 4.1 From the proof strategy we can make the following observations
about a tree generated during a proving process:
(i) A top sequent is the highest sequent of a branch in the tree.
(ii) In a top sequent of a branch on the form of sequent 1, if ϕ ∈ Δ then the top
sequent is an axiom and the branch is called a closed branch. Otherwise, we
say that the branch is open and ϕ is an atomic formula.
(iii) In every sequent of the tree, Δ′ ⊆ Δ.
(iv) For i = 1, . . . n, Υ
pi−1
i−1 ⊆ Υpii .
The proof of completeness of LMT→ is closely related with this strategy and
with the way the proof tree is labeled during the proving process. Section 5 presents
the soundness proof of LMT→ and Section 6, the completeness proof.
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{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 ,Υpi−1i−1 , . . . ,Υpii ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi−1, pi], pk (where k = 1, 2, . . . , i)
...
a sequence of focus, →-left and →-right
{},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi−1], pi
...
a sequence of focus, →-left, →-right and restart (for each atomic formula in the []-area)
{ϕ → ψ},Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δpi ,Υp11 ,Υ1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ [p2, . . . , pi−1, pi, p1], p2
... →-right{ϕ → ψ},Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δpi ,Υp11 ,Υ1 ⇒ [p2, . . . , pi−1, pi, p1], ϕ
...
→-left{ϕ → ψ},Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δpi ,Υ1 ⇒ [p2, . . . , pi−1, pi], p1
focus{},Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δpi ,Υ1 ⇒ [p2, . . . , pi−1, pi], p1 restart-p1{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpi−1i−1 ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pi−1], pi
...
a sequence of focus, →-left and →-right
{ϕ → ψ},Υp11 ,Υ1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ [p1], p2
...
a sequence →-right
{ϕ → ψ},Υp11 ,Υ1 ⇒ [p1], ϕ
...
{ϕ → ψ,ψ}, ψ,Υ1 ⇒ [], p1
focus{ϕ → ψ}, ψ,Υ1 ⇒ [], p1 →-left{ϕ → ψ},Υ1 ⇒ [], p1
focus{}, ϕ → ψ, γ1, . . . , γm ⇒ [], p1
...
{}, ϕ → ψ ⇒ [], γ →-right{} ⇒ [], (ϕ → ψ) → γ













5 Soundness of LMT→
In this section we prove the soundness of LMT→. A few basic facts and deﬁnitions
used in the proof follow.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A sequent {Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , . . . ,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, . . . , pn], ϕ is valid,
if and only if, Δ′,Δ |= ϕ or ∃i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pi, for i = 1, . . . n.
Deﬁnition 5.2 We say that a rule is sound, if and only if, in the case of the premises
of the sequent are valid sequents, then its conclusion also is.
A calculus is sound, if and only if, each of its rules are sound. We prove the
soundness of LMT→ by showing that this is the case for each one of its rules.
Proposition 5.3 Considering validity of a sequent as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.1,
LMT→ is sound.
Proof. We show that supposing that premises of a rule is valid then, the validity
of the conclusion follows. In the sequel we analyze each rule of LMT→.
→-left We need to analyze both premises together, thus we have the combina-
tions described below.
• Supposing the left premise is valid because α → β,Δ′,Δ |= α and the right
premise is valid because α → β,Δ′,Δ, β |= q. We also know that α → β ∈ Δ
and Δ′ ⊆ Δ. In this case, the conclusion holds:
α → β Δ′ Δ
Π
α α → β
β
q
• Supposing the left premise is valid because ∃i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
the conclusion holds as it is the same. Supposing the left premise is true
because Δq |= q, the conclusion also holds, as Δq = Δ.
• Supposing the right premise is valid because ∃i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
then conclusion also holds.
restart Here, we have three cases to evaluate.




pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. The conclusion is also valid.
• Supposing the premise is valid because ∃j(
j⋃
k=i+1
Υpkk ) |= pj , for j = i+1, . . . , n,
then conclusion also holds.
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• Supposing the premise is valid because Δq |= q, then Δ |= q and, as Δ′ ⊆ Δ,
Δ′,Δ |= q.
→-right




pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. This is also valid in the conclusion.
• Supposing the premise is valid because Δ′,Δ, α |= β, then every Kripke model
that satisﬁes Δ′, Δ and α also satisﬁes β. We know that Δ′ ⊆ Δ. Those
models also satisﬁes α → β and, then, conclusion also holds.
focus




pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. This is also valid in the conclusion.
• Supposing the premise is valid because Δ′, α,Δ, α |= β, then the conclusion
also holds as Δ′,Δ, α |= β.

From Proposition 5.3, we conclude that LMT→ only prove tautologies.
6 Completeness of LMT→
By observation 4.1 iii we know that a top sequent of an open branch in an attempt
proof tree has the general form bellow, where q is an atomic formula:
{Δ′},Υp11 ,Υp22 , ...,Υpnn ,Δ ⇒ [p1, p2, ..., pn], q




Υpkk )  pi, for i = 1, . . . n.
Deﬁnition 6.1 We can construct a Kripke counter-model M that falsiﬁes a top
sequent of an open branch. This can be done in the following way:
(i) The modelM has an initial world w, i.e., w is not accessible by any other world.
In w set every atomic formula inside the []-area as false. That is, M w pi, for
i = 1, . . . n.
(ii) Consider a world w0 in M, such that w  w0. By the deﬁnition of an invalid
sequent, Δ′,Δ  q. w0 will be used to guarantee this. We set q false in w0,
i.e, M w0 q. This implies that M w q. We also set every atomic formula
that is in Δ (remember that Δ′ ∈ Δ) as true, i.e., ∀p, p ∈ Δ,M w0 p. This is
consistent with the values of the same atomic formulae in w.
(iii) By the deﬁnition of an invalid sequent, we also need that ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk )  pi, for
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i = 1, . . . n. Thus, for each i, i = 1, . . . n we deﬁne a world wi in M, such that
w  wi. We set ∀p, p ∈ Υpii , p atomic, M wi p. We also set M wi pi.
The general schema of the counter-model generated by the deﬁnition 6.1 is
w
 pi, i = 1, . . . n
wn
∀p, p ∈ Υpnn
p atomic
 p
. . . w1





∀p, p ∈ Δ
 p
Fig. 4. General schema of counter-models
This schema to construct counter-model allows us to state the following lemma:
Lemma 6.2 Let S be a top sequent of an open branch in an attempt proof tree
generated by the strategy presented in Section 4. Then we can construct a Kripke
model M with a world u where M u S, using the aforementioned counter-model
generation schema.
Proof. We can prove this by induction on the degree of formulas in Δ and in Υpii ,
for i = 1, . . . n. From deﬁnition 6.1 ii we know that every atomic formula in Δ
is true in w0 and that w0 q. From deﬁnition 6.1 iii we know that every atomic
formula in Υpii is true in wi and that wi pi. The inductive hypothesis is that every
formula in Δ is true in w0 and that every formula in Υ
pi
i is true in wi.
Thus, we have two cases:
(i) Let α → β be a formula in M→ that is in Δ. We show that M w0 α → β.
Consider that α ≡ (γ1 → (γ2 → ... → (γm → q))). By the proof strategy,
γ1, γ2, . . . , γm also are in Δ. The degree of each of these formulae are less than
the degree of α → β and, by the induction hypothesis, all of them are true in
w0. This makes w0 α and w0 α → β.
(ii) Let α → β be a formula in M→ that is in Υpii , for i = 1, . . . n. We show that
M wi α → β.
Consider that α ≡ (γ1 → (γ2 → ... → (γm → q))). By the proof strategy,
γ1, γ2, . . . , γm also are in Υ
pi
i . The degree of each of these formulae are less
than the degree of α → β and, by the induction hypothesis, all of them are
true in wi. This makes wi α and wi α → β.

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Deﬁnition 6.3 A rule is said invertible or double-sound iﬀ the validity of its con-
clusion implies the validity of its premisses.
In other words, by Deﬁnition 6.3 we know that a counter-model for a top se-
quent of a proof tree which can not be expanded anymore can be used to construct
a counter-model to every sequent in the same branch of the tree until the conclu-
sion (root sequent). In the case of →-right rule in our system, not just that if a
premiss of the rule has a counter-model then so does the conclusion, but the same
counter-model will do. Weich called rules with this property preserving counter
model rules [19]. Dyckhoﬀ proposed call them strongly invertible rules (personal
communication).
Lemma 6.4 The rules of LMT→are invertible.
Proof. We show that the rules of LMT→are invertible when considering a proof
tree labeled in the schema presented in Section 3. We prove that from the existence
of a Kripke model that makes a premise of the rule invalid then, conclusion is also
invalid.
→-right If the premise is invalid, then there is a Kripke model M where
Δ′,Δ, α  β and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk )  pi, for i = 1, . . . , n from a given world u. Thus,
in the conclusion we have:
• By the deﬁnition of semantics of Section 2.1, there have to be a world v, u  v,
in the model M where Δ′,Δ, α are satisﬁed and where β is not. Thus, in v,
α → β can not hold.
• By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υpii and vi pi.
• Thus, the conclusion is also invalid.
→-left Considering that one of the premises of →-left are not valid, the conclu-
sion also is. Thus, we have to evaluate both cases:
• If the right premise is invalid then there is a Kripke model M where α →
β,Δ′,Δ, β  q and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk )  pi, for i = 1, . . . , n from a given world u.
Thus, in the conclusion we have:
· By the model M, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where
α → β,Δ′,Δ, β are satisﬁed and where q is not.
· By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υpii and
vi pi.
· Thus, the conclusion is invalid too.
• If the left premise is invalid then there is a Kripke model M where α →
β,Δ′  α and ∀i(
i⋃
k=1
Υpkk )  pi, for i = 1, . . . , n, and Δ
q
 q from a given world
u. Thus, in the conclusion we have:
· By the model M, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where
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α → β,Δ′ are satisﬁed and where α is not.
· By the model M, for each i, exists a world vi, u  vi, where vi Υpii and
vi pi.
· We also know by M that there is a world vq, u  vq, where vq Δq and
vq q. We also have that Δ
′ ⊆ Δ and that α → β ∈ Δ. Therefore, vq Δ′
and vq α → β.
· Thus, the conclusion can not be valid.
focus If we have a model that invalidates the premise, this model also invalidates
the conclusion as the sequents in the premise and in the conclusion are the same
despite the repetition of the focused formula α.
restart If the restart premise is invalid, then there is a Kripke model M and a
world u from which Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi  pi and ∀j(
j⋃
k=1
Υpkk ) |= pj , for j = i + 1, . . . , n,
and Δq  q. Thus, in the conclusion we have:
• By the model M, there have to be a world v, u  v, in the model where
Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υi are satisﬁed and where pi is not. Each Υk has the same formulae
as Υpkk and, by the restart condition, we know that  pk, for k = 1, . . . , i.
• By the model M, for each j, exists a world vj , u  vj , where vj Υpjj and
vj pj .
• We also know by M that there is a world vq, u  vq, where vq Δq and vq q.
We also have that Δ′ ⊆ Δ. Therefore, vq Δ′.
• Thus, the conclusion is invalid.

Now we can state a proposition about completeness of LMT→:
Proposition 6.5 LMT→ is complete regarding the proof strategy presented in Sec-
tion 3
Proof. It follows direct from Proposition 4.1 (the process always terminates) and
Lemmas 6.4 and 6.2 above. 
7 An automatic theorem prover for M→
Based on the aforementioned system, we developed a theorem prover for M→ (its
source code can be found at https://github.com/jeffsantos/sequent-prover).
Figure 5 shows a fragment of the proof tree generated by this prover for the formula:
((((A → C) → A) → A) → C) → C,
a formula that is shown in [2] to need to use the assumption (((A → C) → A) →
A) → C at least twice to be proved in M→. As presented in [6] this formula is
used as the base to deﬁne a family of formulae in M→with no bounds on the use of
assumptions. Figure 5 shows the expansion of the left branch of the ﬁnal proof.
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8 Related Work
A common way to control the proof search procedure in M→ (and in IPL) is by
the deﬁnition of routines for loop veriﬁcation as proposed in [17]. Loop checkers
are very expensive procedures, although they are eﬀective to guarantee termination
in automatic provers for M→ (and other logics with the same characteristic). The
work in [9] and in [10] are examples of techniques that can be used to minimize the
performance problems that can arise with the usage of such procedures.
To avoid the use of loop checkers, Dyckhoﬀ [3] proposed a terminating
contraction-free sequent calculus for IPL, named LJT, using a technique based
on the work of Vorob’ev [18] in the 50s. Pinto and Dyckhoﬀ, in [13], extended this
work showing a method to generate counter-examples in this system. They pro-
posed two calculi, one for proof search and another for counter-model generation,
forming a way to decide about the validity or not of formulae in IPL. A character-
istic of their systems is that the sub-formula property does not hold on them. In
[5], a similar approach is presented using systems where the sub-formula property
holds. They also proposed a single decision procedure for IPL which guarantee
minimal depth counter-model.
Focused sequent calculi appeared initially in the Andreoli’s work on linear logic
([1]). The author identiﬁed a subset of proofs from Gentzen style sequent calculus,
which are complete and tractable. Liang and Miller [12] proposed the focused
sequent calculi LJF where they used a mapping of IPL into linear logic and adapted
the Andreoli’s system to work with the image. Dyckhoﬀ and Lengrand [4] presented
the focused system LJQ that work direct in IPL. Focusing is used in their system
as a way to implement restrictions in the →-left rule as proposed by [18] and [11].
The work of Dyckhoﬀ and Lengrand follows from the calculus with the same name
presented in [8]. In our approach, focusing is used as a technique to guarantee the
completeness of the system and to produce the counter-model from a failed proof
search process.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented here the deﬁnition of a uniﬁed procedure (the LMT→system) to
generate Kripke counter-models from trees generated by unsuccess proving processes
for M→.
Regarding the LMT→system, we know that the size of the generated counter-
model still takes into account every possible combination of sub-formulae yielding
Kripke models with quite a lot worlds. There are still work to be done in order to
produce smaller models.
On the theorem prover side, our research has a lot of work to be done. Further
work includes the implementation of user strategies that can be combined with
the built-in prover strategy to customize the way the prover conducts the proving
process. Interface and user interaction with the system are other options to improve.
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Fig. 5. Partial proof tree for ((((A → C) → A) → A) → C) → C
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